ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
or students and accounting practitioners alike, it is very complicated and confusing to consider the prospects of managing one's professional liability risks. This is because there are so many potential bases for liability. The purpose of this article is to consider the various theories for liability in a flowchart format to simplify the analysis and management of an accountant's legal risks. This should be helpful to both accounting students and practitioners.
As a matter of trial management by the courts, plaintiffs are effectively forced to bring every possible theory of liability imaginable against the defendant because the courts want to handle all legal issues between the litigants in a single court case. They won't allow the plaintiff to split one legal cause of action into multiple lawsuits based upon different theories of liability derived from the same set of facts. In other words, if the first case didn't result in an acceptable damage award in favor of the plaintiff based upon one theory of liability, it cannot file another lawsuit on a different theory, to see if things turn out better the second, third, etc., time around. The plaintiff will be "estopped" from filing multiple lawsuits based upon the same facts.
Because of this rule of court administration, plaintiffs tend to get very long winded in their complaints in coming up with every possible theory of liability they can think to raise against the defendant. They don't expect to win under every theory but hope to win enough of their legal theories to get acceptable damage awards against their defendants.
As a general rule and relatively speaking, when one reads a professional malpractice complaint, the first legal theories of liability mentioned seem to be quite understandable and straight forward. But as one moves down the list of legal theories for relief, they become more obscure in nature. This is because of the aforementioned rule of court administration.
Not wanting to forget any potential legal theory and then later be denied the ability to raise it at trial, sometimes the list of legal theories for relief stated in the original complaint include things that seem almost unintelligible. The intent of the plaintiff's attorney is to leave the door open to raise some other legal theory for liability, if and when, it later coalesces more clearly in his mind. An old phrase to describe this process is: "He threw everything at him including the kitchen sink." -the "kitchen sink" would be that obscure, grasping-for-straws final attempt to express a viable legal theory of liability against the defendant. From a practical standpoint, that 4 In the case of a "donee beneficiary," the one naming the 3 rd party as a beneficiary under the contract intended to make a gift to that 3 rd party. In the case of a "creditor beneficiary," the one naming the 3 rd party as a beneficiary under the contract, owed him something and was trying to satisfy that legal obligation (at least partially) through this contract with another party. 5 Most likely, a 3 rd party attempting to sue an accountant for breach of contract regarding his professional engagement contract with his client, would claim to fall within the "creditor beneficiary" category. That is because in the accounting malpractice context, the accountant's client would be the one who purportedly named the 3 rd party as an intended beneficiary of the accountant's audit work. In several malpractice law suits the 3 rd party who sued the auditor was a creditor of the audit client and claimed it was hurt by relying upon the auditor's faulty audit work and/or audit report. 6 Often times, people are able to glean only some tangential benefits from other people's contracts-these people are called merely "incidental beneficiaries" and generally have no recognized legal claims regarding other people's contracts. 7 To use an analogy, when you make your dinner for your family and your dog gets the resulting scraps, all of your family members were the "intended beneficiaries" of you culinary efforts, but your dog was just an "incidental beneficiary" of those efforts. Their complaints will likely be seriously considered, but the dog would have no legitimate claim or "legal standing" to complain about the meal.
Even if the 3 rd party could successfully claim that he was an "intended beneficiary," his legal claim will fail unless "vesting" has occurred. 8 Generally, vesting in this context occurs when the 3 rd party (1) finds out about the contract and (2) somehow objectively manifests assent to it. Such manifestations of assent might include expressing gratitude for what the contracting parties did in his behalf; changing position in reliance on the expectation of receiving the benefit that will accrue to him under that contract; suing over the contract; etc.
A 3 rd party's malpractice claim against an accountant for mis-performing his professional obligations to his client, is very confusing since his claim for breach of contract under a 3 rd party beneficiary contract seems so similar to a his potential tort claim of negligence against that accountant. In both contexts, the courts seem to struggle in determining whether or not the accountant owed any legal obligations to that 3 rd party which would effectively give him the legal standing to sue the accountant for some type of professional malpractice. For an example of a potential creditor beneficiary arrangement, consider the situation where the audit client has borrowed money from a creditor which has imposed various debt covenants to be met at the risk of calling the loan due if the debtor lapses into non-compliance. If the creditor required an audit be done to determine continuing compliance, it could argue that it was a 3 rd party creditor-beneficiary of the audit engagement allowing it to sue the auditor for faulty attestation work concerning compliance with those debt covenants. 6 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931.) ); Rusch Factors v. Levin (284 F.Supp. 85 (R.I., 1968) ); Citizens State Bank v. Timm Schmitt (335 N.W.2d 361 (WI, 1983) ); Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen (483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y., 1985) While some might use the term "professional malpractice" very narrowly to describe just negligence, we use the term broadly to describe all the potential bases for liability discussed in our flowchart.
To decide that matter in the tort context, the courts tend to ask the following question: "To whom did the accountant owe a "duty of care?" To decide that matter in the context of a 3 rd party beneficiary contract, the courts tend to ask the following question: "Was the 3 rd party plaintiff a type of intended beneficiary who was vested?"
In both contexts the courts struggle in their efforts to clearly determine when they should carve out exceptions to the general rule that 3 rd parties have no rights or obligations regarding other people's contracts. The courts tend to look at the matter from a tort perspective rather than a 3 rd -party-beneficiary-contract perspective. This may be because the client seldom specifically tells its auditor to whom it (the client) intends to show the audited financial statements.
The Client's Breach of Contract Claims Against Its Accountant
When a client sues its accountant for "breach of contract," the first question becomes: "What were the terms of that contract?" Terms can be (1) expressly agreed upon in the engagement contract, or (2) implied by law.
In drafting the engagement contract, the accountant should be careful not to include ambiguous terms. An ambiguity is a word or phrase that has more than one possible reasonable meaning. If any ambiguities exist in the engagement contract, a common rule of legal interpretation is to interpret them against the interests of the one who drafted the written contract 10 , which in our case, would most likely be the accountant.
Another common rule of legal interpretation is what is called "the plain meaning rule." 11 Under this rule, the express words used in the contract are given their plain meaning.
Both of the foregoing rules can be illustrated by a case called Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen. 12 In that case the auditors promised to disclose to its client (Fund of Funds) any "irregularities" they discovered in the course of their audit work. The defendant auditors sought to have the court apply a narrow and technical meaning to that term but instead, the court applied a broad meaning to that term-one that favored the plaintiff client.
Not only did Arthur Andersen audit Fund of Funds but also audited some other companies that did business with Fund of Funds. During the course of its audits of everyone, Andersen consulted the books of all those entities in order to determine how various transactions between them should be reported in their respective financial statements. In doing that, Andersen discovered that these other companies were committing fraud against Fund of Funds. Andersen never disclosed those frauds to Fund of Funds and Fund of Funds later sued Andersen for "breach of contract" for not disclosing such "irregularities" as per the dictates of their express contract.
Even though Andersen argued that the term "irregularities" had a limited technical meaning and was not meant to cover such things as fraud, the court interpreted that term broadly and in favor of Fund of Funds. Thus it ruled that Andersen breached that express term of their engagement contract with Fund of Funds.
Implied Contractual Terms
In addition to whatever express terms are agreed to between the accountant and his client, the law may imply other terms, which if not properly observed by the accountant, will form the basis of a "breach of contract" law suit against him by his client.
For example, the following contractual terms were implied by law against accountants: an implied duty to use reasonable care in the performance of its professional services 13 ; an implied duty of confidentiality 14 ; an implied duty to follow up on suspicions 15 ; going beyond the normal scope of a compilation may imply that a review (or It should be noted that just following Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) may not be legally sufficient in meeting an auditor's duty of care owed to its client. In the Simon 17 case, seven eminent accounting experts testified that requiring the footnote to the financial statements produced by the auditors to disclose a particular thing 18 would have violated GAAP. Nevertheless, the court said the auditors were legally duty bound to disclose those things at the risk of facing criminal sanctions for not doing so. Surely, if following GAAP would not necessarily protect an auditor from criminal sanctions, it would not necessarily protect an auditor from a breach-of-contract claim regarding implied contractual obligations or from a tort claim for negligence.
Once the court determines the express and implied terms of the contract, it will determine whether or not any of those terms were violated. If the plaintiff can convince the court that any were violated, then the plaintiff client can recover damages to the extent it can prove its injuries. If none of those terms were violated, then the plaintiff will lose its "breach of contract" theory for relief and will have to try to prove its other theories for legal relief, a discussion of which follows.
Punitive Damage Awards are Rare in Breach-of-Contract Cases
It should be noted that punitive damage awards are very rare under the "breach of contract" theory. Punitive damages are designed to civilly punish egregious behavior and make an example out of the defendant to discourage him and others from committing similar atrocious behavior in the future. Normally, such damages are only awarded when intentional torts (like fraud) are involved. 19 Mere claims of negligence are likewise usually insufficient to justify an award for punitive damages. 20 Compensatory damages and consequential/special damages (sometimes both of these types of damages are lumped together and called "actual damages") are designed to make the injured party whole which is the normal purpose of civil remedies.
B. Common Law Tort Theories of Liability
There are three general areas of tort liability. In orders of culpability from least bad to worst, they are negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. From the accountant's perspective, if the court finds that he committed a tort, hopefully the court finds him to have been merely negligent instead of worse since otherwise he faces the prospects of (1) having to pay punitive damages in addition to the plaintiff's actual damages, (2) not having any coverage under his malpractice insurance policy because of possible exclusions in the policy, (3) losing his Certified Public Accountant (CPA) license (or submitting to other practice-restrictive sanctions), and (4) criminal prosecution. Negligence One of the most important issues in a negligence law suit is whether or not the accountant owed any legal "duty of care" to the plaintiff. This is because liability only occurs when the defendant accountant breached such a duty of care. Unquestionably, he owes a duty of care to his client since they are "in privity 18 There, a man name Roth controlled two companies. The one company-the audit client--loaned millions of dollars to the other company which, in turn, loaned the money to Roth personally who lost it in failed stock market speculations. When Roth was unable to repay his personal debt to the one company, it could not repay its debt to the company being audited by the defendant-auditors. The audit client eventually became insolvent because of these bad loans. The question was whether or not the auditors who knew about these things were legally obligated to disclose this information in their audit opinion at that stage of GAAP development. All of the eight expert accounting witnesses who testified said that at the time of the audit, GAAP did not require the disclosure of the loans to Roth. Seven of those eight even went so far as to say such disclosures would actually violate GAAP. Nevertheless, the court said the auditors were legally bound to disclose that information in their audit opinion. 19 See for example, NJ Revised Stat. Section 2a: 15-5.12 (2014) . This New Jersey statute requires the presence of "actual malice" or "wanton and willful" disregard of others who might foreseeably be harmed by the defendant's acts or omissions. It specifically says that mere negligence or even gross negligence are not enough to justify an award of punitive damages. 20 Id.
The most famous tort case by a 3 rd party against an accountant was the Ultramares 21 case in New York. This case occurred shortly after the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and, perhaps because of the financial carnage the highest court in New York saw happening on Wall Street, it decided to protect the accounting profession by ruling that duties of care regarding mere negligence are only owed to those who are in privity of contract. In other words, 3
rd party users of a faulty audit report had no standing to sue the negligent accountant who produced it.
This rule was followed throughout the country until the late 1960s when a Federal District Court 22 in Rhode Island questioned the continuing validity of the Ultramares holding. From that point on, various states started expanding the notion of duty of care in the negligence context regarding 3 rd party users of audit reports thus expanding the legal risks for accountants.
Most states ruled that auditors owed duties of care to all "foreseen" 3 rd parties. Some narrowly said that the 3 rd party had to be individually foreseen while others took a broader approach and said that the 3 rd party only had to be a member of a foreseen limited class of users of the audit reports. Both of these approaches were variations of the Restatement of Torts, 2 nd .
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Some state courts were not satisfied with those approaches and extended the notion of duty of care in the negligence context to all "foreseeable" 3 rd parties. 24 This opened up auditors to even more risk for committing professional malpractice.
25
At that point people wondered if the various state courts would tend to follow the very expansive lead of these courts. Then New York-a very influential state legally-weighed in with the Credit Alliance case. 26 Even though in some cases 27 since Ultramares, the New York courts seemed to be expanding the notion of 3 rd -party-duty in the negligence context, in the Credit Alliance case New York's highest court retreated back towards Ultramares requiring something close to privity.
In the Bily 28 case, the Supreme Court of California took a similar restrictive position effectively protecting most accountants from 3 rd party lawsuits for mere negligence 29 .
By legislative enactment 30 , Utah took a very restrictive view of duties owed to 3 rd parties making it very difficult for 3 rd parties to successfully sue for mere negligence regarding faulty audit work done by accountants.
It is also interesting to note that the New Jersey legislature 31 effectively overturned the rule enunciated by its state Supreme Court in the Rosenblum v. Adler 32 case which was the first court in the country to enunciate a foreseeable-3 rd -party rule regarding accountants' negligence liability. It may be that when the New Jersey legislature perceived that other states were rejecting the lead of its courts, it decided to retreat back towards the privity rule regarding auditor negligence. New Jersey's rule is now very similar to Utah's rule requiring (1) a specifically foreseen 3 rd party user and (2) specific expressions of understanding by the accountant that he or she knew the 3 rd party was going to rely upon the accountant's work, before a court could hold an accountant liable to a 3 rd party user of his negligently prepared accounting work. If a court rules that the auditors owed no duty of care to the 3 rd party plaintiffs who relied upon the faulty audit report, then their negligence theory of relief will be dismissed. On the other hand, if the court rules that the auditors did owe a duty of care to the 3 rd party plaintiffs, then those plaintiffs must prove that the accountants breached that duty of care.
The big issue here is whether following GAAS and GAAP conclusively determines that the accountants met their duty of care and protects them from liability claims filed against them for negligence. In most cases following GAAS and GAAP will protect the auditors from potential negligence liability, but not always. Some courts 34 have ruled that accountants may have to go further than the dictates of the profession in order to meet their legal duty of care and fairly present the financial condition of their audit clients.
So in a negligence lawsuit against an accountant for negligent audit work, the first line of defense for the auditor is to argue that no duty of care was owed to the 3 rd party plaintiff who used the faulty audit report.
If that doesn't work, then he will argue that he met his applicable duty of care owed to that 3 rd party.
If that doesn't work, then the accountant can argue that his fault was not the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's damages. "Proximate cause" is really a public policy determination by a court to limit how far out liability can extend.
To understand this notion, imagine a string of dominoes set up to visibly demonstrate a chain reaction. When the first domino is pushed over, all of the other dominoes in the line fall in succession, so there is no question that the requirement of "actual causation" was met (sometimes this is called the "but for test" i.e., but for pushing over the first domino, none of the other dominoes would have fallen). But even so, a court will not extend liability unless that "actual cause" was also the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injuries.
If we imagined each domino as representing some sort of harm caused to somebody else, the legal question becomes how far down that string of dominoes should liability be allowed to extend. At some point the extension of liability is so farfetched it becomes absurd. So when a court considers "proximate cause" issues, it is deciding where to draw a line across that string of dominoes with liability attaching to all the beginning dominoes up to that line and disallowing negligence liability claims for all the dominoes on the other side of that line. The Timm Schmidt 35 case from Wisconsin explains the types of things courts may consider in determining where to draw that line under proximate cause analysis.
In addition to the foregoing, the accountant may also have some sort of affirmative defense that may lessen, if not totally eliminate, liability to the 3 rd party plaintiffs. For example, perhaps the plaintiff was also negligent in making its business decision to deal with the audit client. After all, considering the audit report is only one step in a multi-faceted decision-making process. If it was negligent in other parts of the decision making process, it shouldn't 33 It may be that the few states that judicially followed the New Jersey Supreme Court's lead in Rosenblum v. Adler have also legislatively followed the lead of the New Jersey legislature and moved their states back to the "foreseen 3 rd party" realm (or even further) of potential liability. We limited our research to New Jersey since it was at the forefront of the "foreseeable 3 rd party" duty-of-care rule. (WI, 1983) ), the court mentioned the following things to consider in deciding where to draw the "proximate cause" line on potential negligence liability regarding accountants: (1) Was the injury too remote? (2) Was the injury too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent accountant? (3) In retrospect, does it appear too highly extraordinary that negligence should have brought about the harm actually caused? (4) Would the extension of liability pose an unreasonable burden on the accounting profession? (5) Would the allowance of liability likely open up the way for fraud? and/or (6) Would allowing recovery enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point?
It may also be that the plaintiff cannot adequately shoulder its burden of proof regarding the causal connection between the defendant-accountant's negligence and the damages the plaintiff supposedly suffered.
Fraud/Deceit
In contrast to the issue of duty of care in the negligence context, courts say that a duty of care in the fraud context is owed to all "foreseeable" 3 rd party users of the audit reports. This also came out of the old Ultramares 37 case. So if the auditor's level of culpability is that serious, he faces significant liability potential and even criminal charges. Most likely, exclusions in his malpractice insurance policy exclude coverage for such behavior.
Common law fraud or deceit normally requires (1) affirmative material misstatements of fact, (2) made with "scienter," (3) made with the intention to induce the victim to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation, (4) justifiable/reasonable reliance on the part of the victim, and (5) damage to the victim resulting from such reliance.
38 "Scienter" means either (a) knowing falsity (i.e. an outright lie) or (b) reckless disregard of the truth.
39
Basically reckless disregard of the truth means making a statement while having no reasonable foundational basis upon which to believe it to be true. Since fraud/deceit is a type of intentional tort, mere negligence on the part of the auditors is not sufficient to prove a case for fraud/deceit. Merely negligent mistaken belief that something is true does not meet the "scienter" requirement since it is not so bad as to be "reckless."
Sometimes courts use the term "constructive fraud." It may be that this is used to describe the "reckless disregard of the truth" portion of the "scienter" test as opposed to a knowing lie on the part of the defendant.
The professional misconduct of accountants seldom rise to the level of fraud/deceit since they usually don't meet the "scienter" requirement-i.e. they usually don't lie about things in their audit reports and they usually have a reasonable (though mistaken) basis upon which to believe their reports to be true. But before passing off this legal risk as being only slight, consider the following things the Ultramares 40 court considered to be fraud on the part of an accountant:
1.
certifying something when there is no genuine belief behind it, 2. certifying correspondence to the books without testing to see if it is true, 3.
closing one's eyes to the obvious, or 4.
giving the pretense of knowledge when there was no knowledge on the part of the accountant.
If the plaintiff can successfully prove his case for fraud/deceit, the defendant-accountant may successfully contend that there was insufficient causal connection between his fraud and the plaintiff's injuries. For example, perhaps a portion of the plaintiff's damages can be ascribed to generally accepted business risks such as: a general downturn in the economy or a specific downturn in the plaintiff's area of business, etc.
Gross Negligence, Recklessness, Wantonness, etc.
Sometimes a defendant's conduct is worse than just negligence but better than outright fraud/deceit. Courts use different terms to describe this middle-ground between negligence and outright fraud/deceit. The various terms include: "gross negligence," "recklessness," and "wantonness."
41 It may be that "constructive fraud" also fits in this middle category. For the rest of this article we will just use the term "gross negligence" to describe this middle common law tort zone. This middle ground is the most obscure potential area of liability. States will differ as to whom an accountant owes a duty of care. Some will probably say that an accountant's duty of care in this middle area extends to all foreseeable 3 rd party users of his statements like in a case for fraud. Others will probably limit the extension of duty in this middle area to 3 rd party members of a foreseen class of potential users of his statements.
Suffice it to say that since the accountant's level of culpability here is worse than mere negligence, in all likelihood, courts will be more generous to 3 rd party plaintiffs regarding this theory and take a more expansive view of duty of care than whatever their rule happens to be in the case of mere negligence.
Like the other two tort areas discussed above, if the plaintiff can successfully prove its case for gross negligence, perhaps the defendant-accountant can effectively reduce what the plaintiff is alleging as damages by questioning the sufficiency of the causal connection between the accountant's tortious conduct and the harms the plaintiff alleges it suffered.
C. Federal and State Statutory Violations

C1. The 1933 Securities Exchange Commission Act
After the stock market crashed in 1929, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 42 to regulate the initial issuance process regarding securities. However, certain types of securities (e.g. bank securities, non-profit educational or religious entities, etc. 43 ) and transactions (e.g. small offerings, intrastate offerings, private placement offerings 44 ) are exempt from having to file a registration statement with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) before offering securities for sale.
If a registration statement is required, accountants associated with the filing could be subject to potential civil liability exposure under Section 11 45 of the '33 Act to the extent they were responsible for any misstatements or omissions of material facts in that registration statement. A private cause of action exists to those who acquired the associated securities and who were injured by such misstatements or omissions. 46 However, no such liability will accrue if, the accountant acted with due diligence 47 ; the misstatements or omissions of facts were not material; the plaintiff knew of the misstatements or omissions of material facts before investing; or there was no causal connection to harm. 48 Even if no registration statement is filed with the SEC, accountants can be held civilly liable for any material misstatements or omissions they are responsible for in the prospectuses and other communications used to sell securities through any of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce under Section 12 of the '33 Act. 49 No Section 12 liability will accrue if the purchaser knew (or reasonably could have known) of the untruth or omission--the plaintiff has the burden of proof regarding those matters. 50 Moreover, even if exempted from filing a registration statement with the SEC, an accountant can be held liable under the '33 Act for any fraudulent misstatements or omissions of material facts relative to sales of securities through any of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. . 45 15 U.S.C 77k (note: when section 11 of the '33 Act was put into the U.S. Code, it came in as a letter instead of a number-the 11 th letter of the alphabet is "k".) 46 15 U.S.C. 77k(a). 47 15 U.S.C. 77k(b)(3) describes this as follows: "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." 48 15 U.S.C. 77k(b)(3). 49 15 U.S.C. 77l (note: when section 12 of the '33 Act was put into the U.S. Code, it came in as a letter instead of a number-the 12 th letter of the alphabet is "l".) 50 15 U.S.C. 77l(a)(2). 51 15 U.S.C. 77q.
Regarding the potential for "joint and several" civil liability under the '33 Act, see discussion below regarding the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Willful violations of the '33 Act will expose the accountant to a $10,000 fine and imprisonment for up to five years. 53 In addition, such willful violations can cause a civil penalty of up to $500,000.
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C2. The 1934 Securities Exchange Commission Act
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 55 was passed to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets" 56 regarding transactions in securities. So basically, the '34 Act regulates the resale markets. Under what has come to be known as "Rule 10b-5" it is unlawful for any person to use "any manipulative or deceptive device" in connection with the purchase or sale of any security using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
57
This includes affirmatively making "any untrue statement of a material fact" or "omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made….not misleading."
58
Usually common law fraud requires affirmative misstatements of material facts, but securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, also includes omitting material facts. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in order for a private cause of action 59 to arise under Rule 10b-5, the defendant accountants must have acted with "scienter" or intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud-in other words, mere negligence will not suffice.
60
The '34 Act also prohibits "insider trading" 61 based upon "material, non-public information." 62 In addition to potentially being liable to any contemporaneous trader for the amount of any profit gained or loss avoided, 63 an inside trader can suffer civil penalties of up to three times the amount of profits gained or losses avoided. 64 Moreover, criminal penalties can also be assessed as described below. Sometimes auditors are privy to material non-public information and should resist the temptation to personally trade on that information lest they violate the insider trading rules.
If an accountant makes any material misstatements or omissions of material fact in any filing with the SEC that is required by the '34 Act, he can face liability in private causes of action under Section 18 65 of the '34 Act. No liability would exist under this section however, if (1) the SEC filing (containing those misstatements or omissions) did not itself 66 affect the prices of the security, (2) the plaintiff knew about the misstatement or omission before buying or selling the security, (3) the plaintiff did not rely upon the filing, (4) th letter of the alphabet ("j") rather than a number.) 58 17 CFR 240.10b-5. Arthur Andersen violated Rule 10b-5 when it failed to disclose that one audit client was being defrauded by another audit client of Andersen's, which fraud affected the value of the first client's stock on a national stock exchange. Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen (545 F. Supp. 1314 (SDNY, 1982 ) 59 The term "private cause of action" means that people and entities (other than just the government itself), can bring a lawsuit over the matter. 60 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (425 U.S. 185 (March 30, 1976) ) 61 15 U.S.C. 78j (second full paragraph). 62 15 U.S.C. 78u-1(a)(1). 63 15 U.S.C. 78t-1. 64 15 U.S.C. 78u-1(a)(2). 65 15 U.S.C. 78(r) (Note: when section 18 of the '34 Act was put into the U.S. Code, it came in as a letter instead of a number-the 18 th letter of the alphabet is "r".) 66 See the U.S. Supreme Court's discussion in footnote 31 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (425 U.S. 185, (March 30, 1976) ). It appears the market price of the security must be affected by the SEC filing itself in order for a plaintiff to have a private cause of action under Section 18 against those responsible for that filing.
The U.S. Supreme Court 68 said the following in discussing the foregoing "good faith" defense: "something more than negligence on the part of the defendant is required for recovery" under Section 18. So an accountant can be negligent and still satisfy the requirements for the "good faith" defense available to him under Section 18 of the '34 Act.
The statute of limitations runs on Section 18 lawsuits on the earlier to occur of (1) one year after the discovery of the facts constituting a Section 18 cause of action, or (2) 3 years after that cause of action came into being.
69
Accountants could also be exposed to potential liability for material misstatements or omissions in proxy solicitation materials under Rule 14a-9 which says in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other form of communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statements made therein not false or misleading ...
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Some accountants were held criminally liable for material misstatements and omissions in unaudited financial statements attached to proxy solicitation materials. The problem was they knew there were material misstatements and omissions in those proxy materials but did not insist upon their correction by management.
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Regarding the potential for "joint and several" civil liability under the '34 Act, see discussion below regarding the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. "Aiding and abetting" liability under the '34 Act can only exist if the defendant "knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person" in violating the Act. 72 Civil penalties for violations of the '34 Act (other than insider trading civil penalties 73 ) can go up to $500,000. 74 Criminal penalties for willful violations of the '34 Act can include fines of up to $5 million and imprisonment for up to 20 years.
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C3. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 76
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amends certain provisions of the '33 Act, the '34 Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute.
Joint-and-Several Liability
In securities litigation, often times many different parties are partially at fault for the material misstatements or omissions that form the basis of the legal claim by the plaintiff(s). When multiple parties injure others and the "joint-and-several liability" rule applies, then a plaintiff can choose to collect all of his proven Joint and several liability regimes often make it easy for plaintiffs to strong-arm peripheral co-defendants like accountants into huge settlements to buy their way out of potentially devastating lawsuits when other moreculpable co-defendants were the ones primarily responsible for the damages caused. This is particularly important to accountants when the more culpable co-defendant (e.g. their audit client) has gone bankrupt.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 changed this regime under the '34 Act but only slightly regarding lawsuits under the '33 Act. Now, unless the co-defendants went so far as to commit fraud, they no longer face the prospects of joint-and-several liability in securities litigation under the '34 Act. In other words, they will only be severally liable to the plaintiffs to the extent of their proportionate fault. 77 However, this Act only slightly modified the rule regarding defendants sued under the '33 Act. Except in the case of suit against an "outside director," other co-defendants face the prospects of joint and several liability in '33 Act lawsuits.
Safe Harbor Rules for Forward-Looking Statements
For the sake of giving the marketplace access to more useful forward-looking information, Congress created a safe harbor that, to some extent, protects the issuers of such statements from potential litigation when the future does not play out as expected.
Accountants might be involved in the production of such forward-looking statements that affect the value of their clients' securities thus exposing them to potential liability under the federal securities laws. Generally speaking, if forward-looking statements contain "meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement," the issuers of such statements will be protected from potential liability claims under both the '33 Act and the '34 Act. 79 Moreover, even if such cautionary statements are lacking, no liability under the federal securities laws will exist regarding forward-looking statements unless the plaintiff can prove that the defendant had "actual knowledge …that the statement was false or misleading." 80 However, this safe-harbor protection does not apply within the context of financial statements prepared in accordance with generally acceptable accounting principles.
81 So effectively, the protection only potentially helps accountants in other types of statements with which they are associated. Also, among other types of non-covered situations, the safe harbor rules do not protect the ones making forward-looking statements regarding initial public offerings (IPOs), tender offers, partnerships, limited liabilities companies (LLCs), penny stock companies, etc.
82
The foregoing statutory rules are also expressed by the accounting profession in AT Section 301 "Financial Forecasts and Projections."
Amendments to the RICO Statute Securities fraud will not count as a potential predicate offense necessary to violate the RICO statute unless the person was criminally convicted for it.
1.
procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts; 2.
procedures designed to identify related-party transactions that are material to the financial statements or otherwise require disclosure therein; and 3.
an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year.
85
Unless it is clearly determined to be inconsequential, if the auditor becomes aware of illegal acts that have material effects on the financial statements, it must report them to management and make sure the audit committee becomes aware of it. If the audit committee does not notify the SEC of the auditor's report on such material illegal acts within one business day after receiving it, the auditor must either resign from the audit or furnish the SEC with a copy of its report. 86 The auditor is protected from potential liability for such disclosures.
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No New Independent Causes of Action
It appears the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 does not create any new private causes of action against accountants that are independent of the other causes of action discussed in this article. Its effect on potential professional liability is generally reducing in nature, rather than expanding. It just potentially affects our analysis of the other causes of action discussed.
For example, regarding the audits of companies required to file with the SEC under the '34 Act, it expands the things auditors must do to meet their duty of care in both the contract and tort contexts, and to meet their professional standing duties before the PCAOB.
C4. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 88
Although depending upon the circumstances an accountant can violate other provisions of the RICO statute, probably the part that has the most potential application to accountants is the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity….
89
The necessary "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity committed within a 10-year period. 90 Similarly, although depending upon the circumstances an accountant may participate in other types of 84 Those that have (1) at least $10 million in total assets and (2) 2,000 or more shareholders (or if less, have at least 500 shareholders who are considered to be unaccredited investors by SEC standards). 15 U.S.C. 78l(g). 
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The Clute Institute racketeering activities listed in the statute, the following would be the most likely ones that could put accountants at risk under the RICO statute: mail fraud; wire fraud; obstruction of justice; obstruction of criminal investigations; tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant; unlawful welfare fund payments; and bankruptcy fraud (Title 11). 91 As discussed in section C3 above, securities fraud will not count as a potential predicate offense necessary to violate the RICO statute unless the person was criminally convicted for it.
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Filing knowingly-false tax returns could be types of mail fraud or wire fraud depending upon whether the U.S. Mail or the internet was used as the means of transmission to the IRS. Sending out confirmation letters that imply things that are not true could amount to mail fraud if the sender knew the implications were false.
93
Destroying documents could amount to obstruction of justice or obstruction of criminal investigations. Andersen's wholesale shredding of audit documents in the Enron case comes to mind here even though its criminal conviction did not rest upon that basis but rather, upon attempts by at least one person to alter or destroy emails regarding instructions from the firm's headquarters concerning the destruction of documents.
RICO violations can involve both civil and criminal liability. Generally, criminal conduct requires some sort of knowing and willful violation of the law-negligence is normally not sufficient to result in a criminal conviction. At the heart of most of the predicate offenses listed above, is some sort of fraud which normally entails making material misstatements of fact with scienter (i.e., either knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.) These should suffice to justify both civil and criminal liability.
Criminal penalties include forfeiture of property and imprisonment for up to 20 years. 94 Civil damages would entail treble damages (i.e., 3 times the actual amount of damages caused the plaintiff) plus reasonable attorney's fees.
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C5. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
96
Sometimes this is called "Sarbanes-Oxley," "Sarbox," or just "SOX." This was passed in response to the audit failure of Enron by its auditor, Arthur Andersen. Generally it created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 97 to regulate the audits of companies required to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Effectively the PCAOB has the power 98 to modify Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) regarding such companies. Consequently some have described the situation as effectively bifurcating GAAP and GAAS into "little GAAP & GAAS" and "big GAAP & GAAS"-the former applying to companies that do not fall within the coverage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the latter applying to those that do.
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Only Registered Public Accounting Firms (RPAF) can perform the audits on companies required to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 100 . All RPAFs are subject to audit by the PCAOB 101 --in other words, the auditors must themselves be audited to make sure adequate Quality Control standards are being observed in the audits of public companies. If the PCAOB finds that an RPAF has not complied with it rules, the firm could lose its authorization to audit public companies and could face civil penalties of up to $15 million for intentional or reckless violations of those rules.
C7. State "Blue Sky Securities Laws"
When issuing and dealing in securities, practitioners must not only consider the reach of the federal securities laws (discussed above under the "33 Act" and "34 Act"), but must also consider the reach of state securities laws which are generally referred to as "Blue Sky Laws." These are too many and varied to discuss in detail here.
CONCLUSION
As one can see from the foregoing discussion, potential liability for accountants is cumulative in nature. Several different legal theories of liability may apply to the same nucleus of facts. There are three broad theories of liability, namely, (1) contractual liability, (2) tort liability, and (3) statutory liability (both federal and state.) The flowchart attempts to prompt consideration of the major areas of concern under each broad theory of liability and discuss some of the affirmative defenses that can be raised by accountants to avoid, or at least minimize, their potential liability exposure.
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(B) Liability under the common law of torts:
If fruad is alleged in the compliant, our analysis at B would probably carry over to B' since, a duty of care is owed to all foreseeable 3 rd parties regarding fraud. But this theory would probably fail under our B' analysis since the culpability level of the auditors here surely would not rise to the level of fraud since the "scienter" test has not been met-the auditors did not either (1) knowingly make any material misstatements of fact or (2) make any material misstatements of fact in "reckless disregard of the truth." Failure to review a staff auditor's testing procedures seems to be an ordinary act of carelessness rather than "recklessness."
If gross negligence is alleged in the complaint, our analysis would carry over to B'only if under the state law in question, a duty of care was deemed to be owed to these particular 3 rd party plaintiffs. Since the bank would be a specifically foreseen 3 rd party user of the audit report, we would go over to B' for further analysis of this theory of liability. However, we would only carry our analysis over to B' regarding the investors, if the law of the state in question extended a duty of care under this theory of relief to all "foreseeable" 3 rd party users of the audit report.
But in our analysis at B', it is doubtful the plaintiffs would win under this legal theory since failure to review a staff auditor's testing procedures seems to be just an ordinary act of carelessness rather than something more "gross" or egregious in nature. But perhaps a jury might think it was very egregious to not review a new staff auditor's testing procedures.
If mere negligence is alleged in the complaint, in our analysis at level B, the court would probably throw out this theory of liability regarding the investors but not concerning Apex and the the bank since the bank meets the restrictive version of the extension of "duty of care" under the Restatement of Torts, 2 nd . The investors weren't specifically/individually foreseen by the auditors whereas the bank was.
Under our analysis at B' regarding Apex and the bank, most likely a court would rule that the auditors breached their duty of care owed to Apex and the bank since the auditors did not follow the dictates of GAAS in failing to review the work of inexperienced staff auditors.
The auditors may be able to lessen, if not totally avoid liability under this theory, by arguing some sort of affirmative defense like comparative negligence on the part of the bank or lack of proximate causation. For example, perhaps the circumstances were such that even with the clean audit report, the bank was unreasonable in making its decision to lend money to the audit client. For instance, perhaps the audit client/borrower's industry was dying generally-maybe they were making horse buggies on the eve of the automobile revolution or typewriters on the eve of the personal computer revolution. Maybe from past business dealings they independently had reasons to doubt the integrity of the company's management team, etc.
Regarding lack of proximate causation, perhaps the court would think (in the words of the Timm Schmitt case) that the "injury was too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent accountant."
Even if the bank wins regarding those arguments by the auditors, it may still have some difficulty proving the actual amount of the damages it sustained as a result of the auditor's negligence-after all, other factors might have had some influence over what actually happened besides just what the auditors failed to do.
Regarding potential negligence liability to Apex, perhaps the auditors could lessen their potential liability by arguing the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. But depending upon the state law in question, that defense might not even be available to the auditors in trying to defend themselves in the case.
(C1) Liability under the Securities Act of 1933:
This was a new issuance of a security through the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, so the '33 Act potentially applies. If the stock issuance qualified as an exempt transaction, then no registration statement would need to be filed with the SEC and Section 11 of the '33 Act would not come into play absent a filing with the SEC.
